T 1946/21
| Board | 3.2.03 |
|---|---|
| Date of Decision | 2023-05-05 |
| Language of the Proceedings | EN |
| Internal Distribution Code | C |
| Proceeding Type | Inter partes |
| Official Keywords | priority - transfer of priority right on filing date of subsequent application - validity of priority date (yes) - partial priority (yes) |
See also abstracts under Article 15a(2) RPBA 2020.
In T 1946/21 the appellant (opponent) and the intervener argued that the right to priority had not been validly transferred to the respondent (patent proprietor) because the written agreement had only been signed on the filing date of the subsequent application.
As the smallest time unit under the EPC was a day, an assignment on the day of the filing of the subsequent application was insufficient. Moreover, claim 1 as granted did not correspond to a "generic 'OR'-claim" within the meaning of G 1/15 and no partial priority could be acknowledged. Therefore, the respondent was not entitled to claim priority from D29, which became novelty destroying.
The board held that it was sufficient for the applicant or patent proprietor to demonstrate that the assignment of the priority right was effective before the actual filing of the subsequent application. The law did not set forth any other condition. In particular, the assignment need not be effective before the filing date of the subsequent application.
This was the case for the person who was "successor in title" either of the patent application including the right to priority or of only the right to priority.
There was also no reason to read such a requirement into the law. Doing so would lead to a situation where a successor in title who had obtained the right to priority on a certain day by way of an assignment always had to wait for the next day to file the subsequent application to enjoy its right to priority. Moreover, in that situation, no one would be able to enjoy the right to priority for a certain amount of time. It would also mean that even though the applicant of the subsequent application had already obtained the right to priority and was in fact already the successor in title, it could not make use of the full 12-month period under Art. 87(1) EPC.
According to the board, at least for the EPC, there was no general rule that the smallest time unit was a day. The smallest time unit was a day when it came to calculating and computing time periods (see R. 131(1) EPC) and was applicable for example when calculating the 12-month period laid down in Art. 87(1) EPC. There was, however, no reason why this should be generally applicable to other situations, in particular for the determination of the requirement of "successor in title".
The appellant and the intervener had also relied on the principle of legitimate expectation, in particular because the Guidelines A-III,°6.1 had consistently referred to the requirement "before the filing date". The board pointed out that what the law requires from applicants for them to enjoy a right to priority cannot be determined by what is stated in the Guidelines, either directly or indirectly by way of creating a legitimate expectation.
Taking into account the evidence on file, the board found that the respondent had indeed demonstrated that the contracts regarding the transfer of the right to priority had been validly concluded when it filed the subsequent application. This was not contested by the other parties. Thus, the then applicant was indeed the "successor in title" who enjoyed the right to priority within the meaning of Art. 87(1) EPC.
On whether partial priority could be acknowledged, the board pointed out that the fact that very many alternatives could be identified was not a reason for denying that there was a generic "OR"-claim or, more generally, for not applying the findings in G 1/15.
The appellant's and the intervener's argument essentially relied on the requirement of a "limited number of clearly defined alternatives" taken from G 2/98. However, this (additional) requirement for acknowledging partial priority was explicitly rejected by the Enlarged Board in G 1/15. The Enlarged Board acknowledged in G 1/15 that the task of determining the relevant disclosure of the priority document taken as a whole, and determining whether that subject-matter was encompassed by the claim in the subsequent application could generally be a demanding intellectual exercise but was common practice at the EPO and among practitioners of the European patent system.
This exercise was, moreover, not difficult in the case in hand, in which the priority document itself was the allegedly novelty-destroying disclosure. In this situation, the (partial) priority of the claim based on this priority document was valid for every potentially novelty-destroying element disclosed in this very same priority document.
Thus, the subject-matter of claim 1 (in its entirety) was novel over D29 since the claim enjoyed partial priority from that document for all the encompassed matter disclosed in it.
109-10-23 Article 87(1) EPC | G 0001/22 and G 0002/22 | Enlarged Board of Appeal Article: Article 087(1) EPC Cases Number: G 0001/22 and G 0002/22 Board: EBA Date of decision: 2023.10.10 Language of the proceedings: EN Internal distribution code: A Inter partes/ex parte: Inter partes EPC Articles: Articles 054, 060, 061, 072, 076, 087, 088, 089, 112(1)(a), 118, 139(2) EPC EPC Rules: Rules 014, 052, 053 EPC RPBA: Other legal provisions: Articles 4, 19 Paris Convention, Article 11(3) PCT Keywords: admissibility (yes) - rephrasing of referred questions (yes) - competence of the EPO to assess entitlement to priority (yes) - rebuttable presumption of entitlement - implied agreement Cited decisions: G 0003/92, G 0003/93, G 0001/97, G 0002/98, G 0002/04, G 0001/15, J 0015/80, J 0019/87, J 0011/95, T 1008/96, T 0998/99, T 0015/01, T 0062/05, T 0788/05, T 0493/06, T 0382/07, T 0577/11, T 1933/12, T 2357/12, T 0205/14, T 0517/14, T 0725/14, T 1201/14, T 0239/16, T 2431/07, T 0844/18, T 1946/21 Case Law Book: II.D.2.2., 10th edition In consolidated cases G 1/22 and G 2/22, the Enlarged Board ("EBA") considered the points of law referred to it by Technical Board of Appeal 3.3.04 (the "referring board") in T 1513/17 and T 2719/19 (consolidated). In the cases underlying the referral the priority claim had been found to be invalid. This had led to the revocation of the patent (T 1513/17) and the refusal of the application (T 2719/19) for lack of novelty.
The application on which the patent was granted in T 1513/17 (and from which the application derived in T 2719/19) was filed as an international application under the PCT (the "PCT application"). It named (i) the 3 inventors as applicants for the US only and (ii) other (legal) persons including the appellant ("Party B") as applicants for all other designated States. The PCT application claimed priority from a US provisional application filed in the name of the 3 inventors. The opposition division and the examining division found the priority claim to be invalid because only 1 of the 3 inventors had assigned the priority right to Party B prior to the filing of the PCT application. Thus, intermediate publications were novelty-destroying. The referring board referred two questions to the EBA: (I) whether the EPC conferred jurisdiction on the EPO to determine whether a party validly claims to be a successor in title as referred to in Art. 87(1) EPC; and (II) if so, whether in the situation described above, Party B could validly rely on the priority right claimed in the PCT application for the purpose of claiming priority rights under Art. 87(1) EPC. The EBA rephrased question I as: "Is the EPO competent to assess whether a party is entitled to claim priority under Article 87(1) EPC?". Both questions were admissible under Art. 112(1)(a) EPC.
The EBA noted that a strict distinction should be made between the title to the subsequent application and the right to claim the priority date for that application.
Art. 60(3) EPC did not apply to the right of priority referred to in Art. 87(1) EPC, neither directly nor by analogy. The EBA concluded that the EPO was competent to assess priority entitlement and that this assessment should be made under the autonomous law of the EPC. According to the EBA, there is a rebuttable presumption under the autonomous law of the EPC that the applicant claiming priority in accordance with Art. 88(1) EPC is entitled. This presumption was justified in view of (i) the interests of the parties involved, (ii) the lack of formal requirements for the transfer of priority rights and (iii) the necessary cooperation between the priority applicant and the subsequent applicant in the context of procedural requirements under Art. 88(1) EPC. The presumption also applies where the European patent application derives from a PCT application and/or where the priority applicants are not identical with the subsequent applicants. It therefore applied to the situation described in question II. The EBA also endorsed the concept of an implied agreement and concluded that, in the absence of substantial factual indications to the contrary, the joint filing of a PCT application sufficiently proved that the parties had entered into an implied agreement allowing Party B to rely on the priority.
The EBA answered the questions of law referred to it as follows: I. The European Patent Office is competent to assess whether a party is entitled to claim priority under Article 87(1) EPC.
There is a rebuttable presumption under the autonomous law of the EPC that the applicant claiming priority in accordance with Article 88(1) EPC and the corresponding Implementing Regulations is entitled to claim priority.
II. The rebuttable presumption also applies in situations where the European patent application derives from a PCT application and/or where the priority applicant(s) are not identical with the subsequent applicant(s).
In a situation where a PCT application is jointly filed by parties A and B, (i) designating party A for one or more designated States and party B for one or more other designated States, and (ii) claiming priority from an earlier patent application designating party A as the applicant, the joint filing implies an agreement between parties A and B allowing party B to rely on the priority, unless there are substantial factual indications to the contrary.
156/7-13-23
In T 1946/21 the appellant (opponent) and the intervener argued that the right to priority had not been validly transferred to the respondent (patent proprietor) because the written agreement had only been signed on the filing date of the subsequent application.
As the smallest time unit under the EPC was a day, an assignment on the day of the filing of the subsequent application was insufficient. Moreover, claim 1 as granted did not correspond to a "generic 'OR'-claim" within the meaning of G 1/15 and no partial priority could be acknowledged. Therefore, the respondent was not entitled to claim priority from D29, which became novelty destroying.
The board held that it was sufficient for the applicant or patent proprietor to demonstrate that the assignment of the priority right was effective before the actual filing of the subsequent application. The law did not set forth any other condition. In particular, the assignment need not be effective before the filing date of the subsequent application.
This was the case for the person who was "successor in title" either of the patent application including the right to priority or of only the right to priority.
There was also no reason to read such a requirement into the law. Doing so would lead to a situation where a successor in title who had obtained the right to priority on a certain day by way of an assignment always had to wait for the next day to file the subsequent application to enjoy its right to priority. Moreover, in that situation, no one would be able to enjoy the right to priority for a certain amount of time. It would also mean that even though the applicant of the subsequent application had already obtained the right to priority and was in fact already the successor in title, it could not make use of the full 12-month period under Art. 87(1) EPC.
According to the board, at least for the EPC, there was no general rule that the smallest time unit was a day. The smallest time unit was a day when it came to calculating and computing time periods (see R. 131(1) EPC) and was applicable for example when calculating the 12-month period laid down in Art. 87(1) EPC. There was, however, no reason why this should be generally applicable to other situations, in particular for the determination of the requirement of "successor in title".
The appellant and the intervener had also relied on the principle of legitimate expectation, in particular because the Guidelines A-III,°6.1 had consistently referred to the requirement "before the filing date". The board pointed out that what the law requires from applicants for them to enjoy a right to priority cannot be determined by what is stated in the Guidelines, either directly or indirectly by way of creating a legitimate expectation.
Taking into account the evidence on file, the board found that the respondent had indeed demonstrated that the contracts regarding the transfer of the right to priority had been validly concluded when it filed the subsequent application. This was not contested by the other parties. Thus, the then applicant was indeed the "successor in title" who enjoyed the right to priority within the meaning of Art. 87(1) EPC.
On whether partial priority could be acknowledged, the board pointed out that the fact that very many alternatives could be identified was not a reason for denying that there was a generic "OR"-claim or, more generally, for not applying the findings in G 1/15.
The appellant's and the intervener's argument essentially relied on the requirement of a "limited number of clearly defined alternatives" taken from G 2/98. However, this (additional) requirement for acknowledging partial priority was explicitly rejected by the Enlarged Board in G 1/15. The Enlarged Board acknowledged in G 1/15 that the task of determining the relevant disclosure of the priority document taken as a whole, and determining whether that subject-matter was encompassed by the claim in the subsequent application could generally be a demanding intellectual exercise but was common practice at the EPO and among practitioners of the European patent system.
This exercise was, moreover, not difficult in the case in hand, in which the priority document itself was the allegedly novelty-destroying disclosure. In this situation, the (partial) priority of the claim based on this priority document was valid for every potentially novelty-destroying element disclosed in this very same priority document.
Thus, the subject-matter of claim 1 (in its entirety) was novel over D29 since the claim enjoyed partial priority from that document for all the encompassed matter disclosed in it.
109-10-23 Article 87(1) EPC | G 0001/22 and G 0002/22 | Enlarged Board of Appeal Article: Article 087(1) EPC Cases Number: G 0001/22 and G 0002/22 Board: EBA Date of decision: 2023.10.10 Language of the proceedings: EN Internal distribution code: A Inter partes/ex parte: Inter partes EPC Articles: Articles 054, 060, 061, 072, 076, 087, 088, 089, 112(1)(a), 118, 139(2) EPC EPC Rules: Rules 014, 052, 053 EPC RPBA: Other legal provisions: Articles 4, 19 Paris Convention, Article 11(3) PCT Keywords: admissibility (yes) - rephrasing of referred questions (yes) - competence of the EPO to assess entitlement to priority (yes) - rebuttable presumption of entitlement - implied agreement Cited decisions: G 0003/92, G 0003/93, G 0001/97, G 0002/98, G 0002/04, G 0001/15, J 0015/80, J 0019/87, J 0011/95, T 1008/96, T 0998/99, T 0015/01, T 0062/05, T 0788/05, T 0493/06, T 0382/07, T 0577/11, T 1933/12, T 2357/12, T 0205/14, T 0517/14, T 0725/14, T 1201/14, T 0239/16, T 2431/07, T 0844/18, T 1946/21 Case Law Book: II.D.2.2., 10th edition In consolidated cases G 1/22 and G 2/22, the Enlarged Board ("EBA") considered the points of law referred to it by Technical Board of Appeal 3.3.04 (the "referring board") in T 1513/17 and T 2719/19 (consolidated). In the cases underlying the referral the priority claim had been found to be invalid. This had led to the revocation of the patent (T 1513/17) and the refusal of the application (T 2719/19) for lack of novelty.
The application on which the patent was granted in T 1513/17 (and from which the application derived in T 2719/19) was filed as an international application under the PCT (the "PCT application"). It named (i) the 3 inventors as applicants for the US only and (ii) other (legal) persons including the appellant ("Party B") as applicants for all other designated States. The PCT application claimed priority from a US provisional application filed in the name of the 3 inventors. The opposition division and the examining division found the priority claim to be invalid because only 1 of the 3 inventors had assigned the priority right to Party B prior to the filing of the PCT application. Thus, intermediate publications were novelty-destroying. The referring board referred two questions to the EBA: (I) whether the EPC conferred jurisdiction on the EPO to determine whether a party validly claims to be a successor in title as referred to in Art. 87(1) EPC; and (II) if so, whether in the situation described above, Party B could validly rely on the priority right claimed in the PCT application for the purpose of claiming priority rights under Art. 87(1) EPC. The EBA rephrased question I as: "Is the EPO competent to assess whether a party is entitled to claim priority under Article 87(1) EPC?". Both questions were admissible under Art. 112(1)(a) EPC.
The EBA noted that a strict distinction should be made between the title to the subsequent application and the right to claim the priority date for that application.
Art. 60(3) EPC did not apply to the right of priority referred to in Art. 87(1) EPC, neither directly nor by analogy. The EBA concluded that the EPO was competent to assess priority entitlement and that this assessment should be made under the autonomous law of the EPC. According to the EBA, there is a rebuttable presumption under the autonomous law of the EPC that the applicant claiming priority in accordance with Art. 88(1) EPC is entitled. This presumption was justified in view of (i) the interests of the parties involved, (ii) the lack of formal requirements for the transfer of priority rights and (iii) the necessary cooperation between the priority applicant and the subsequent applicant in the context of procedural requirements under Art. 88(1) EPC. The presumption also applies where the European patent application derives from a PCT application and/or where the priority applicants are not identical with the subsequent applicants. It therefore applied to the situation described in question II. The EBA also endorsed the concept of an implied agreement and concluded that, in the absence of substantial factual indications to the contrary, the joint filing of a PCT application sufficiently proved that the parties had entered into an implied agreement allowing Party B to rely on the priority.
The EBA answered the questions of law referred to it as follows: I. The European Patent Office is competent to assess whether a party is entitled to claim priority under Article 87(1) EPC.
There is a rebuttable presumption under the autonomous law of the EPC that the applicant claiming priority in accordance with Article 88(1) EPC and the corresponding Implementing Regulations is entitled to claim priority.
II. The rebuttable presumption also applies in situations where the European patent application derives from a PCT application and/or where the priority applicant(s) are not identical with the subsequent applicant(s).
In a situation where a PCT application is jointly filed by parties A and B, (i) designating party A for one or more designated States and party B for one or more other designated States, and (ii) claiming priority from an earlier patent application designating party A as the applicant, the joint filing implies an agreement between parties A and B allowing party B to rely on the priority, unless there are substantial factual indications to the contrary.
156/7-13-23