T 1076/21
| Board | 3.3.05 |
|---|---|
| Date of Decision | 2023-05-26 |
| Language of the Proceedings | EN |
| Internal Distribution Code | C |
| Proceeding Type | Inter partes |
| Official Keywords | law of evidence - apportioning the burden of proof - appeal after revocation of the patent by opposition division - no automatic shift of the burden to the patent proprietor - necessity for the opponent to discharge its burden - benefit of the doubt |
In T 1076/21, with reference to T 585/92, the respondent (opponent) argued that the appellant (patent proprietor) bore the burden to prove that the patent was sufficiently disclosed because the opposition division had revoked the patent. The appellant contested that the respondent had successfully discharged its initial burden of proof.
The board concluded that the burden of proof regarding the facts, arguments and evidence on the substance (which initially lay with the opponent) did not shift to the proprietor just because the patent had been revoked due to an alleged insufficient disclosure.
The board recalled that only if there are serious doubts, substantiated by verifiable facts, may an application (or a patent) be objected to for insufficient disclosure (T 19/90). After the grant of the patent a legal presumption exists that the patent meets the requirements of the EPC. This presumption can be rebutted. The weight of the submissions required to rebut the presumption depends on its strength (T 63/06, T 55/18). The initial burden on the opponent to provide facts, arguments and evidence for an assertion of an insufficient disclosure may shift to the patent proprietor once the opponent has successfully discharged its burden of proof by submitting sufficient facts, arguments and evidence to rebut the presumption (T 338/10, T 2218/16). However, this shift can only be caused by sufficient submissions on the substance; formal reasons alone, like the mere existence of the opposition division's decision to revoke the patent, do not lead to a shift of the burden of proof on the substance. If the reasoning in the impugned decision as such is found to be wrong, there cannot be any shift of the "burden of proof on the substance" (T 499/00, T 1608/13).
Linked to the burden of proof is the "burden to substantiate a case". Thus, the opponent first has to provide facts and argue why these facts support its assertion (T 182/89).
This burden to substantiate facts and arguments is then followed by the burden to prove these facts, normally done by submitting evidence. Only in the exceptional case of a weak presumption of validity due to a lack of information in the patent may the submission of plausible arguments alone be sufficient (T 63/06, T 1558/11). Often both aspects are together referred to as the burden of proof.
This might have led to the misconception that any decision finding insufficiency would lead to the burden of proof being shifted to the patent proprietor. However, when distinguishing the "burden to substantiate a case" from the "burden of proof on the substance" the board found that it could be clearly deduced from the case law that after a decision by the opposition division allowing an objection of insufficiency, it was down to the patent proprietor to substantiate on appeal why that decision was wrong. The burden of proof on the substance (and in consequence the benefit of the doubt), however, was only shifted when the opposition division's assessment that the presented facts, arguments and evidence were sufficient to discharge the opponent's burden of proof turned out to be correct. The appellant bore the burden to substantiate the appeal.
Yet the board noted that an appeal case need not necessarily be substantiated by submitting facts and evidence that counter the arguments and evidence presented by the opponent. It may also be substantiated by submitting why the opposition division's reasoning on insufficiency was flawed and why the burden of proof on the substance still lies with the opponent.
The patent proprietor here substantiated its appeal. The respondent did not submit evidence that the guidance in the patent was insufficient, and also did not show that the alleged unusual parameter was indeed unusual; it did not discharge its burden of proof on the substance. The opposition division could not base its decision on verifiable facts as required. There was no shift of the burden to the patent proprietor. Concerning another aspect, the board concluded that since the parties had made contradictory but unsubstantiated assertions concerning facts, the patent proprietor ought to be given the benefit of the doubt (T 72/04).
134-11-23
The board concluded that the burden of proof regarding the facts, arguments and evidence on the substance (which initially lay with the opponent) did not shift to the proprietor just because the patent had been revoked due to an alleged insufficient disclosure.
The board recalled that only if there are serious doubts, substantiated by verifiable facts, may an application (or a patent) be objected to for insufficient disclosure (T 19/90). After the grant of the patent a legal presumption exists that the patent meets the requirements of the EPC. This presumption can be rebutted. The weight of the submissions required to rebut the presumption depends on its strength (T 63/06, T 55/18). The initial burden on the opponent to provide facts, arguments and evidence for an assertion of an insufficient disclosure may shift to the patent proprietor once the opponent has successfully discharged its burden of proof by submitting sufficient facts, arguments and evidence to rebut the presumption (T 338/10, T 2218/16). However, this shift can only be caused by sufficient submissions on the substance; formal reasons alone, like the mere existence of the opposition division's decision to revoke the patent, do not lead to a shift of the burden of proof on the substance. If the reasoning in the impugned decision as such is found to be wrong, there cannot be any shift of the "burden of proof on the substance" (T 499/00, T 1608/13).
Linked to the burden of proof is the "burden to substantiate a case". Thus, the opponent first has to provide facts and argue why these facts support its assertion (T 182/89).
This burden to substantiate facts and arguments is then followed by the burden to prove these facts, normally done by submitting evidence. Only in the exceptional case of a weak presumption of validity due to a lack of information in the patent may the submission of plausible arguments alone be sufficient (T 63/06, T 1558/11). Often both aspects are together referred to as the burden of proof.
This might have led to the misconception that any decision finding insufficiency would lead to the burden of proof being shifted to the patent proprietor. However, when distinguishing the "burden to substantiate a case" from the "burden of proof on the substance" the board found that it could be clearly deduced from the case law that after a decision by the opposition division allowing an objection of insufficiency, it was down to the patent proprietor to substantiate on appeal why that decision was wrong. The burden of proof on the substance (and in consequence the benefit of the doubt), however, was only shifted when the opposition division's assessment that the presented facts, arguments and evidence were sufficient to discharge the opponent's burden of proof turned out to be correct. The appellant bore the burden to substantiate the appeal.
Yet the board noted that an appeal case need not necessarily be substantiated by submitting facts and evidence that counter the arguments and evidence presented by the opponent. It may also be substantiated by submitting why the opposition division's reasoning on insufficiency was flawed and why the burden of proof on the substance still lies with the opponent.
The patent proprietor here substantiated its appeal. The respondent did not submit evidence that the guidance in the patent was insufficient, and also did not show that the alleged unusual parameter was indeed unusual; it did not discharge its burden of proof on the substance. The opposition division could not base its decision on verifiable facts as required. There was no shift of the burden to the patent proprietor. Concerning another aspect, the board concluded that since the parties had made contradictory but unsubstantiated assertions concerning facts, the patent proprietor ought to be given the benefit of the doubt (T 72/04).
134-11-23